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Abstract 
Changes are proposed to improve urban water supply systems around the globe. 
Improvement in service delivery mechanisms, institutional efficiency, financial viability and 
acceptance by users are the key criteria for initiating and sustaining a change. To improve the 
situation of water supply in Karachi, Pakistan, advised by the World Bank, a private sector 
participation (PSP) strategy was formed during the 1990s. The strategy aimed to promote a 
gradual increase of PSP in water and sanitation services. The proposed project faced strong 
resistance from stakeholders, mainly civil society, leading to its suspension. Efforts are being 
made to revive the PSP and to make it acceptable to the stakeholders concerned. The paper 
documents and analyses the stakeholders’ response to the anticipated PSP process and the 
possible social and economic impacts. The study makes a contribution in the areas of 
participation and consensus building in the context of PSP. Willingness to negotiate continuously 
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and even consideration of possible alternatives based on the changing situations are the key to 
any way forward for sustainable improvements. 
Keywords: Privatisation, Stakeholders response, donors perspective.  
 
1. Privatisation of water supply in Karachi, Pakistan 
1.1. Background 
Many private sector participation (PSP) strategies around the world face the issues 
described in paper. PSPs are proposed and attract huge support and opposition depending on 
one’s viewpoint. In many cases the procurement process is delayed because of lack of agreement 
among the stakeholders. Studies like these that analyse and document the process leading to 
suspension of PSP processing are crucial to understanding the ways forward. 
Traditionally, public sector institutions provided urban water supply services in cities 
around the world, through a variety of delivery procedures. Arrangements usually comprised 
direct provision through municipalities or their constituent departments, direct provision through 
special purpose authorities, provision through corporate bodies under the direct control of the 
public sector and provision through autonomous or semi-autonomous organisations. The control 
of these arrangements varied depending on the social, political and economic context. As the 
service networks expanded, institutional arrangements also had to be made compatible with the 
emerging levels of demand1. 
Studies of urban areas in the developing world have shown that the water supply and 
waste water disposal arrangements fall short of rising demand and the increasing expectations of 
consumers. There are many reasons why this situation arises. Low tariff levels, poor revenue 
recovery, political interference, obsolete technologies and overstaffing are some common 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Rivera (1996). 
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ailments. Despite the fact that the majority of these cities have loan and technical assistance 
arrangements with donor agencies, the situation has not improved. To address this, governments 
have tried various options. One of the possibilities is to turn to the private sector and arrange 
contractual agreements. 
There are numerous reasons for adopting this approach. In the recent past, water has 
come to be considered as an economic good owing to expanding demand and the nature of the 
economic input that is required to generate and distribute it. In the view of governments, 
particularly those in developing countries, water supply should be a function of enterprise rather 
than public welfare. As a result of the different nature of their links with the system, the interests 
of different sets of stakeholders are often in conflict with one another. For example, where the 
developmental and managerial functions of providing water are largely carried out with the 
support of donor agencies, it is obviously in the interests of those donors to maintain the smooth 
and methodical repayment of loans. Urban management authorities, on the other hand, try to 
utilise the loans to expand service networks and to consolidate management. Similarly, political 
leaders wish to please voters, while consumers wish to obtain the best services at the least cost. 
Petty water vendors, meanwhile, tend to create conditions that increase sales of their water and 
may even do this at the cost of criminally disrupting the routine water supply system2. Such 
complex intentions often give rise to situations where the systems of supply breakdown and the 
service delivery network does not deliver the desired service level. In such situations, alternate 
arrangements have to be sought in order to create an efficient water supply system that functions 
to the satisfaction of the maximum number of stakeholders. Introduction of private sector 
participation (PSP) is one of these alternative arrangements. 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Water and Sanitation Programme (WSP) (1998). 
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One of the major concerns when introducing privatisation is the probable impact that it 
may have on consumers, mainly the urban poor. However, appropriately designed solutions 
usually prove to be useful and effective. In Santiago, Chile, for example, the government devised 
a targeted support package for the urban poor. This helped those on low incomes become 
revenue-generating customers of water similar to upper- and middle-income groups. To make 
this step possible, a water stamp system was devised where the government provided a subsidy 
to the water bills of low-income groups. The system has worked fairly well (Briscoe, 1997). In 
Conakry, Guinea, water utility performance was declining, so the government leased water 
sector assets to a private operator who was then paid a fee that reflected the full cost of providing 
water services. Initially, the government charged water customers only a quarter of this fee while 
the remaining amount was covered through a World Bank loan. Water users were informed 
about the whole package and were briefed about the price escalation that would take place in 
proportion to the service improvement. The package has worked fairly well (Rivera, 1996; 
Briscoe, 1998). Recently, private sector participation has been introduced in many cities in many 
countries. Adelaide (Australia), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Gdansk (Poland), Jakarta (Indonesia), 
Johor (Malaysia), Macao, Manila (Philippines), Northumbrian Water (in the United Kingdom) 
and Santiago (Chile) are some examples. These cities have entered into an entirely different set 
of arrangements for PSP. Such interventions have met with mixed results. While the World Bank 
normally terms privatisation as a means of reform, other stakeholders take a different view. 
Privatisation was introduced in Pakistan mainly through the advice of donor agencies like 
the World Bank. The Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB)3 was taken as an initial case. 
                                                 
3 As part of the ongoing local government reforms, KWSB was merged into the recently formed City District 
Government of Karachi during February 2003. It is officially called the Water and Sanitation Department (WSD). 
However its internal organisational structure, operations and billing/revenue generating prerogatives have remained 
unchanged. 
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Unlike many urban centres in Pakistan, which are either located along a body of fresh water or 
depend on groundwater sources, Karachi receives water from distant sources. An extensive 
generation, filtration, pumping/boosting and piping system is an integral part of the water supply 
service in Karachi (see Table 1). 
1.2. Strategy for PSP in KWSB 
According to the feasibility study (Paribas & Halcrow, 1998), KWSB faced two major 
problems; insufficient control of the network that resulted in inequitable distribution and sizable 
water losses, and unsatisfied retail consumers who were reluctant to pay the bills. The PSP in 
KWSB was based on premises that addressed these vital issues. It was envisaged that tariff 
increase must correspond to tangible improvements in levels of service. Water loss reduction was 
to be dealt as a priority. Budgetary subsidies to KWSB, which were continually provided by the 
Government of Pakistan (GoS) were not sustainable as the GoS had to concur its own budget 
constraints. Private sector, more precisely international water companies, possess the full range 
of technical and financial capacities to deal with the situation. The whole investment in this 
specific context could be to the extent of US$ 4 billion or more to generate efficiency that could 
allow for phased increase in tariffs. Concession shall however remain an essential prerequisite at 
least during the initial phase of the project implementation. 
The feasibility study outlined several prerequisites for the success of PSP. The 
consultants emphasised that investment in the programme must be service driven. From the 
various technical and financial studies, they had come to the view that a substantial improvement 
in service level could be achieved with modest investment, that is, around US$ 100 million. A 
stable and predicable environment with an appropriately derived legal and institutional 
framework was deemed to be a necessary requirement for PSP. To make the whole enterprise 
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attractive for the potential investors/private operators, it was suggested that a local financial 
institution might be approached to provide grace period financing during the initial years of PSP 
implementation. In the same respect, GoS was required to commit the increase in tariffs up to 
20% per annum for at least the initial five years, to approach the GoP, the World Bank or Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) for risk guarantees (such as World Bank’s partial risk guarantee) and 
to make the appropriate relaxation in its own debt service timetable. 
Following the advice of the World Bank, the Provincial Government of Sindh (GoS) 
prepared a private sector participation strategy in 19944. The KWSB was advised of this decision 
in 1995. The key aspects of the strategy were transparency in the process5, obtaining the best 
expertise on the subject and keeping a close liaison with the World Bank. Drawing on their 
worldwide experience, the World Bank suggested a shortlist of eight leading international 
organisations to the GoS for consideration. These organisations possessed vast experience in 
water sector privatisation. The officials of the KWSB and the GoS attended deliberations on the 
subject in Paris during 1995 to obtain an insight from the various international experts (Banque 
Paribas, 1997). 
Terms of reference were prepared for the consultants to assist in the process of PSP. The 
eight firms on the shortlist were invited to submit detailed technical and financial proposals. The 
terms of reference required the consultants to develop a PSP strategy for their preferred approach 
to Karachi’s water supply and sewerage sector. Each strategy had to: 
• involve the private sector in renewal, improvement, expansion, operations and 
maintenance; 
                                                 
4 The participants in framing the basic details of PSP, including its Terms of Reference, were the Chief Minister of 
Sindh, Senior Minister of Sindh, Additional Chief Secretary to GoS and Managing Director of KWSB (Ahmed, 
1998). As may be observed in the later discussion, more emphasis remained on financial aspects and less on service 
improvement affairs. 
5 See for example Whittington (2003). 
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• conduct a detailed technical and financial feasibility study of the scenarios considered; 
• assess the possible impacts of the PSP approach on key criteria; 
• present a finance strategy for mobilising the investments to the GoS; 
• prepare prequalification and bidding documents; and 
• assist the GoS in the bidding process and draft the final contract document (Banque 
Paribas, 1997). 
After clearance of the terms of reference, the eight organisations were invited to submit 
detailed technical and financial proposals. The proposals were evaluated by the steering 
committee with specialist advice provided by the World Bank, and were subsequently presented 
to the GoS for clearance. 
As the executing agency, KWSB coordinated the PSP consultancy project that was 
carried out. The consultant’s report on Phase I was submitted and approved with certain 
modifications. The agreed approach was structured into three phases (see Table 2). The first 
phase covered the development of the most appropriate PSP strategy. This phase is now 
completed. The second phase covered the preparatory work for the PSP. This phase was also 
completed and a detailed feasibility report submitted to the GoS. The third phase, 
implementation of the agreed programme, has been partly started. Some bidding documents were 
received from the short-listed contractors. However, owing to a Sindh High Court order, the 
process of private sector participation was temporarily halted in 19966. 
At present, efforts are being made to convert the KWSB into a water and sewerage 
regulatory authority while all executive tasks are being given to private entrepreneurs with a 
                                                 
6 Some stakeholders, including the labour union and an ex-Managing Director of the KWSB, filed a writ petition in 
the Provincial High Court. In a hearing, the Sindh High Court has maintained the status quo on PSP (see Daily 
Dawn, Karachi 21 May 2003). 
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suitable background. In other words, the current approach of the government aims to limit the 
functions of the KWSB to a body prescribing rules, regulations and procedures for the provision 
of water and sanitation services. The actual task of providing these services will eventually pass 
onto private operators who will have the freedom to frame rules of business after obtaining 
approval from the regulatory body. 
1.3. Advocacy and support for PSP by the government 
In order to publicise and develop a broad-based consensus on the need for the 
implementation of PSP in the KWSB, an intensive media campaign was carried out. This 
included meetings with concerned citizens via debates, seminars, workshops and question–
answer sessions on the PSP and involved a cross-section of people and organisations. Ministers, 
even those belonging to different regimes, affirmed their resolve to apply PSP as a top priority. A 
series of articles and letters to the editors in leading newspapers were also published. In addition, 
press notes were issued, journalists briefed and extensive dialogue held with non-government 
organisations (NGOs) and trade unions. Brochures were also printed and widely circulated and 
televised debates were held, all designed to reach as wide a spectrum of the citizens of Karachi 
as possible. Individual citizens, along with business and advocacy groups, participated in a wide-
ranging debate on the subject (KWSB, 1998). 
As a result of this well-defined media campaign, both the print and electronic media gave 
good coverage to various developments, covering almost all aspects of PSP in the KWSB. 
During the public awareness campaign, efforts were made to ensure that accurate and impartial 
information was made available about the on-going process with regard to PSP strategies as 
proposed by the consultants and approved by the GoS. 
2. Stakeholders’ response 
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To obtain feedback on the issues relating to the private sector participation, a response 
was sought from the various stakeholders involved. This feedback was acquired via a pre-
prepared set of questions discussed in an interview format with the research team. Below is a 
summary of the responses received from various categories of stakeholders. The same is also 
outlined in Table 3. 
2.1. The government’s response 
A great deal of criticism was cited in the press, professional organisations and civil 
society groups against the concept, procedure and approach of PSP in the KWSB. In order to 
obtain an objective viewpoint, the GoS appointed an independent committee to look into the 
matter. This committee, which comprised two senior civil servants and two independent 
economists, was requested by the GoS: 
• to look at the process of PSP in the KWSB from a financial, an administrative and a 
social angle; 
• to examine the financial benefits, if any, to the GoS; 
• to examine the commitments that were to be made by the GoP and the GoS; 
• to review the affordability of the proposed rates, especially by the low-income groups, to 
pay water charges; and 
• to review the mechanisms for payment of the foreign, as well as local/loans. 
The independent committee, which was a panel of bureaucrats and working 
professionals, conducted several independent hearings with the concerned stakeholders to obtain 
directly their viewpoint. Though appointed by GoS, its conduct was fairly independent. After 
deliberations and contact with the donor agencies concerned, government departments, KWSB 
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staff, NGOs/community-based organisations (CBOs) and concerned individuals, the committee 
gave its response. 
The equity to be provided by the successful bidder was US$50 million, one sixth of the 
total transaction. The remaining US$250 million were to be borne by the governments of 
Pakistan and Sindh and World Bank’s Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG). In addition, the GoS agreed 
to increase tariffs in the pre-PSP period by 30% per year for five years, plus an increase of 20% 
in real terms for another five years. Besides, the GoS had agreed to provide suitable guarantees 
against the main categories of risk including political, revenue-related, collection, inflation, 
currency/transaction and force majeure. In the light of the feasibility, a risk mitigation package 
was finalised that included a GoP letter covering the commitments of GoS in the PSP-concession 
contract; US$40 million from the World Bank-PRG, also backed by GoP counter guarantee and 
a US$50 million available on an escrow account to be disbursed in favour of the project lenders 
upon the occurrence of predefined events. All this was aimed at helping the successful bidder 
without them having to give any firm guarantees. Despite a most favourable contractual deal, 
representatives of the bidders interviewed by the committee had several reservations. 
The committee appointed by the GoS found that the consultants did not see the current 
climate as being favourable for a smooth transaction7. The committee was doubtful about the 
sustained working of foreign investors in a politically uncertain climate such as Karachi. The 
committee was also averse to putting an excessive burden on low-income groups should there be 
tariff revisions. In addition, there was no clear strategy in the PSP regarding squatter settlements, 
where about half the urban population resides. In sum, the independent committee found that the 
upper management of the GoS/KWSB were only interested in putting in motion the process of 
eliminating the debt that the KWSB had accumulated since its creation in 1983. However, even 
                                                 
7 Communicated through a letter to the Managing Director of KWSB, dated 4 June 1998. 
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on these grounds, no sizeable evidence was found that the strategy would succeed, as the 
successful bidder was to be given a five-year concession8 (Usmani et al., 1999). 
2.2. The KWSB’s response 
The staff, union, engineers and officers of the KWSB board also gave their views on the 
issue of privatisation. All the cadres of KWSB staff were against PSP, though for a variety of 
reasons. In their view, the PSP process evolved as a result of World Bank advice, not because of 
local demand. No options of any PSP were discussed by the KWSB neither in their board 
meetings nor at any other forum before it was promoted by the Bank. Besides, since no scientific 
study was ever conducted to ascertain the demand, it could only be inferred as a donor driven 
strategy. Also, essential stakeholders—that is, consumers, KWSB staff and the government—
were unable to participate equally in the process, while the PSP was finalised in secrecy without 
even bringing in the governing body of the board. The KWSB staff members were also of the 
view that other possible options were not explored. For example, innovative strategies of cost 
recovery, along with suitable legislative and administrative cover, should be worked out as an 
initial measure towards improvement. The apparent problems of the water supply and sanitation 
were probably known to all, but they required objective study to identify the root causes and help 
develop a possible solution. In this case, it appeared that a prescriptive approach was adopted. 
Since the Bank was already involved in enforcing privatisation in other contexts and sectors, it 
probably applied the same logic to KWSB. Besides, the whole process needed to be carried out 
openly to curb chances of malpractice and to ensure transparency. 
2.3. Water traders 
                                                 
8 According to various financial documents on the issue, the outstanding loan of KWSB was as high as US$1 billion, 
almost 20 times the total annual budget of the KWSB. 
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Owing to the inadequate and improper piped system of water supply, many informal 
modes of water vending have emerged in Karachi over the years. Though informal, these modes 
are highly organised and possess a well-defined clientele for their operations. Water vending 
takes place through water tankers, donkey carts, pushcarts, manual water carriers and community 
water taps in squatter settlements. In this category, two representatives were approached—a 
former chairman of the Karachi Water Tanker Association and a tanker operator. 
According to their views, at least 10% of the urban population of Karachi depend directly 
upon tankers. Because of this poor level of service, the KWSB may not be able to recover its 
bills. In the view of the water vendors’ representatives, privatisation is not likely to solve these 
problems. They believe the government should invite all the stakeholders to discuss the issues 
relating to privatisation. 
The water traders also believe the poor have already been purchasing water at high 
prices. Thus, if the service level improves as a result of privatisation, it may not be a bad choice. 
However, water vending practices will continue despite privatisation. Vending will continue to 
serve the population that is denied access to piped water at the moment. The KWSB feeds a 
limited area and clientele and a sizeable number of consumers are likely to remain dependent on 
the tanker service, particularly in low-income areas. 
2.4. Real estate builders and developers 
The wide-ranging residential construction undertaken by real estate builders and 
developers makes them a major stakeholder in the water sector. Builders and developers were 
approached through their union, the Association of Builders and Developers (ABAD). 
In ABAD’s view, the KWSB’s performance was below the desired level. A serious gap 
prevailed between supply and demand, water leakages were on the rise, thefts had increased and 
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the board was failing to recover revenue and to monitor the revenue it did recover. These were 
the main reasons that had led to the privatisation. ABAD believe the KWSB has the potential to 
rectify its defects, but think that it does not have the will to do so. The objective of privatisation 
should be to raise the performance of the institution while keeping the service affordable to the 
average citizen. 
ABAD expect the water supply system to improve after privatisation. They also think the 
private sector is likely to detect a smooth and periodical recovery of revenue across the means of 
water supplied. The administrative and managerial performance of the KWSB is also likely to 
improve after privatisation. Technical standards would improve and staffing would be 
rationalised. More funds could be made available for development and extension of the network. 
However, these improvements will largely depend upon the process, procedure and 
system of privatisation adopted. If privatisation were carried out in a similar manner to that in 
common enterprises such as banks, the results would be disastrous. The builders and developers 
believe that, owing to its very different nature, the water utility’s privatisation needs to be 
carefully worked out. The current process of privatisation is not appropriate. The KWSB is being 
directly sold to a foreign company. Another concern of the builders and developers was that 
tariffs would rise monumentally. This would be a burden on the people, especially low-income 
groups. 
ABAD think that the best way could be to privatise gradually so that minimum 
disturbance occurs and the whole process is completed in a smooth and transitional fashion. In 
the public interest, there should be a local partner firm that could work with the foreign firm for a 
stipulated period. Then the local firm could eventually take over after developing adequate 
capacity. 
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A basic prerequisite of privatisation could be to search and develop alternate sources of 
water, such as desalination. There is a possibility that the water quality would improve after 
privatisation. However, the sewerage sector services would require proper investment and 
planning in accordance with the enhanced water supply. Privatisation may help remove the 
serious ills of KWSB, such as overstaffing. However the prerequisite for privatisation should be 
to ensure supply that is proportional to needs. Squatter dwellers also need to be brought into the 
tax net. 
2.5. Local politicians 
Karachi was governed by an elected municipal government for a very short period of 
time during its post independence history. The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, now defunct, 
was replaced by a City District Government that was run by an elected mayor and councillors for 
a little over 10 years. A twice Mayor of Karachi, who was also the Chairman of the KWSB (by 
virtue of his mayoral role), was interviewed. In addition, a local councillor was also interviewed 
who has been active in local politics for a very long time. He belongs to a small, low-income 
settlement in Karachi. 
In the view of the former mayor and the councillor, the people, including consumers, 
staff and politicians, are generally against privatisation. For them, the most significant impact of 
privatisation can be unemployment. The local politicians believe that the KWSB (and other 
similar institutions) are being forced into privatisation because of the financial malpractices of 
politicians. Resource scarcity is a prime reason for the leakages and thefts, which remain 
unchecked in the water and sanitation sector. They held the view that a prerequisite for financial 
improvement of the KWSB is to have honest people in all the departments. Legally, all the 
properties and assets of the KWSB belong to the city municipality. Therefore, the municipality 
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must also be consulted. They also think tariff increases and price hikes will be devastating, 
especially for poor people. 
Generally, privatisation has not proved successful in many units and enterprises that have 
been privatised. The objective of privatisation should be to provide the best possible service at an 
affordable price. These local politicians think the privatisation of the KWSB will have grave 
social implications for the people, including unemployment of staff. An alternate path would be 
to increase the salary scale of workers to prevent them from entering into corruption. Besides, 
the workers should be consulted before any move is finalised. 
2.6. Consultants 
Three consultants who have direct experience of privatisation were interviewed. Their 
views are summarised below. 
The consultants thought, as a result of privatisation, people will have to pay extra charges 
for the same kind of service that is available to them today. Privatisation is likely to be unjust for 
Karachi. Poor people, in particular, will not be able to obtain water after the system has been 
privatised and only affluent areas may benefit. This is because the private operator will provide 
water only to those who can pay for it. Neither quality nor quantity of water is supposed to 
improve after the PSP. In addition, any improvement in administrative affairs will only arise if it 
is desired by the private operator. In general, the consultants think that the present method of 
privatisation is not desirable in the current scenario. 
The consultants believe that for privatisation to be successful it is important that 
monopolisation of the system be avoided. During privatisation the focus should be on improving 
services and letting technical people take over affairs without interference from politicians. In 
addition, decision making should be done transparently, without any trace of malpractice or 
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underhand dealing. The government must also develop a physical plan to execute decisions such 
as privatisation. The demand for and supply of water also needs to be reassessed. The consultants 
think that consumption, not the characteristics of location, should be made the basis of water 
charges. In addition, if need-based planning is not carried out for water supply, then there are 
likely to be water riots. By relying on the honest and capable human resources of the KWSB, and 
by recruiting more such people, KWSB affairs could be structured properly. 
2.7. City administrators 
During the entire post-independence period, the administration of water supply was 
controlled by three institutions. These were the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, the Karachi 
Development Authority and, lately, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board. The earlier two are 
now defunct having been merged into the City District Government of Karachi (CDGK) in 2001. 
The former heads of these three institutions were interviewed. Their views are given below. 
In the administrators’ view, privatisation may not be useful as it will be difficult to get a 
sincere buyer for the whole exercise. Before resorting to privatisation, they said, other 
alternatives should be carefully studied, making increases in the source of water the top priority. 
They believe a private entrepreneur would find it even more difficult to recover revenue and 
would be unable to solve problems such as faulty billing, recovery and operational systems. 
Different internal systems within the KWSB need to be considered and this should be done 
without delay. 
The administrators think it is only the World Bank that is pushing for privatisation. Other 
donors are not informed or properly involved in the process. In addition, the procedure that has 
been adopted for privatisation is faulty and full of loopholes. It will give rise to confusion and 
bad performance. Qualified and trained staff are also in short supply in the KWSB, while the 
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problem of political appointees is giving rise to issues such as alleged overstaffing. Nor have 
innovative solutions been included in the privatisation procedure, for example, desalination. 
Finally, the administrators said that privatisation of the water supply was not advisable from the 
defence and internal security point of view. It may render the city vulnerable to external threats. 
2.8. Concerned citizens’ groups 
There were several citizens’ groups who showed deep concern about the adopted process 
of PSP. Three such groups were interviewed, each having divergent views. These interviews 
were held between February and April 1999. These are summarised below. 
One group thinks that privatisation may be a good option. The present system has been 
disappointing for those who pay their bills but do not get water. Low-income localities, on the 
other hand, often steal water, creating a burden on paying citizens. As the KWSB continues to 
remain politically motivated, mismanaged and corrupt, privatisation appears to be the last resort. 
This first group believes that protection should be sought for the paying citizens. 
In the view of another citizens’, if core government departments settle their water bills9, 
then perhaps privatisation may not be needed. For them, privatisation is not advisable. It may 
give rise to price hikes, unemployment and cause an end to public control. Without an 
appropriate dialogue to streamline the objectives of privatisation, decentralisation and to involve 
people, this kind of experiment will not succeed. This second group also believes that 
privatisation of the KWSB may not improve levels of service. People are likely to pay a higher 
price for an inferior service. Nor will the system improve as a result of privatisation; people will 
continue to get bad quality water. This group also found it difficult to believe that a foreign 
                                                 
9 Water bills of several core government departments are lying unpaid. Because of their administrative clout, they 
succeed in delaying the payment, causing hardship to the water utility. 
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investor would come and invest in a sector in which the government itself is not investing10! In 
addition, the situation of sewerage can become worse as it may not receive attention and 
investment. Privatisation will cause burden on common people. 
The third citizens’ group thought that, in order to improve the water supply and sanitation 
service and to make people pay user charges, the KWSB should be privatised. The objective of 
this privatisation should be to improve efficiency and service delivery. If appropriate research is 
carried out and the privatisation is based on the findings of this research, then privatisation is 
likely to give positive results. This group also believed that privatisation can improve the water 
supply and sanitation service. For them, a regulatory system is needed to ensure proper water 
quality, accountability and transparency of operations. Standard rules, regulations and 
procedures of privatisation should be followed during the process. Also, the government should 
reduce its role and promote good governance. While privatisation is not a bad option, it may not 
be properly carried out in the KWSB’s case because of the culture of developing monopolies and 
bypassing rules and regulations. The objective of privatisation, in general, should be to provide 
the people with basic services (water included) at affordable prices. 
Others thought that, owing to rampant thefts and leakages, precedents of corruption and 
overstaffing, the privatisation might not be a successful event. However, privatisation could be 
useful in a limited way—for example, it can motivate employees to work. In addition, 
administratively, the KWSB may improve after privatisation. By improving water management 
and by controlling the thefts/leakages, the water supply and sanitation system could be largely 
improved. There is also a possibility that the KWSB could gain financially and administratively. 
                                                 
10 This viewpoint evolved from the fact that the routine maintenance and upkeep of water-related infrastructure was 
grossly dismal. The government departments responsible for them were not investing even sufficient capital to 
maintain these service delivery assets. It was therefore difficult for common people to understand the reasons why a 
foreign investor would put capital into a sector that was found practically unworthy of governmental attention. 
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However, in their opinion, water quality may not improve after privatisation. The privatisation 
may also cause unemployment, while water and sanitation services may become expensive and 
unaffordable. For this group, the prerequisites of privatisation include eradication of corruption, 
affordable delivery of water (at least for basic needs) and a mechanism of just distribution. 
People should also be consulted during the privatisation process. In their view, the union of the 
KWSB is opposing privatisation for its own interests; the greater interests of consumers should 
be upheld in all the moves. 
2.9. Residents of planned areas 
Mostly, the residents of planned areas have regular water connections and receive 
water/conservancy bills. However, different areas have different levels of service. The water 
supply and sanitation situation is bad in many new areas as well as in the old town. The residents 
of an apartment complex in a planned locality were interviewed. 
These residents say they have no idea about what the benefits will be from privatisation 
because this aspect was never made public. However, they see that their water bills are rising 
monumentally. They paid Rs569 per year per house in 1996. Now the average bill is Rs3600, 
despite the fact that the service has declined. In addition, they have to pay for tankers during the 
peak of summer. The residents interviewed say they cannot pay inflated water bills any longer. 
In their view, whoever takes over the KWSB should try to manage it on the same budget. 
Although they say that if they can get a continuous supply of clean, pure drinking water they 
may think of paying more, they believe that this is not possible. The apartment complex residents 
doubt that privatisation will do any good to the existing system. 
2.10. Residents of unplanned areas 
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There are 568 squatter settlements in Karachi, where more than half of the city’s 
population live. These squatter settlements, which are of different ages, size, socio-economic 
composition and location characteristics, also have different levels of basic services available to 
them. Some of these settlements are very old, even older than Pakistan. Others are new and have 
only developed recently. In order to obtain feedback from the residents of unplanned areas, two 
forums were held11. One forum was held in a service sector settlement located at the edge of an 
affluent area of the city. The second was held in a traditional squatter settlement along an old 
river bed location. The results of these interviews are summarised below. 
The first forum found that, in terms of improvement of services, privatisation of the 
KWSB might be useful. However, all the details relating to the privatisation must be made public 
before any decision is taken. Privatisation will force the people of squatter settlements to 
safeguard their internal infrastructure so as to avoid losses and thefts. Although privatisation of 
the KWSB can be beneficial for the government, the benefits to the citizens are not so clear. In 
the view of this forum, the staff of the KWSB should be protected during the privatisation, while 
at the same time being given more powers to perform their duties effectively. They believe the 
KWSB and the private company should form a partnership12. They should develop standard rules 
for the provision of water and sanitation services. The people on this forum thought that if the 
KWSB stays as a government institution, if will be favourable for the poor. 
The second forum said that people in low-income settlements do not get water despite 
their paying water bills. In their view, if privatisation has to take place, the tariffs should be kept 
compatible with the average person’s paying capacity. In observing experiments in the past, it 
                                                 
11 These forums were organised and conducted by the authors during the course of this study. Ordinary residents 
from two large squatter settlements were requested to participate. The squatters were located in the west and south 
of the city. They were chosen randomly, however, considering the fact that they were more then two decades old. 
12 In a very modest way, the community leader was referring to the concept of public–private partnership. 
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appears that privatisation will give the successful bidder monopoly powers. Also, the 
government will not be able to safeguard people’s interests. Hence, in these people’s view, the 
outcome of privatisation may lead to an increase in user charges. However, this can be prevented 
by increasing connections and improving facilities. For them, there are two aspects of 
privatisation: one, people would get clean and adequate water and two, prices would rise 
considerably. If this happens, then the government must ensure price control. The second forum 
thought that certain problems within the current system would be eradicated as a result of 
privatisation. Financial bungling in the award of contracts, corruption, wastage of water and 
political interference could be controlled. They thought people’s representatives should be 
assigned the task of monitoring the performance of private company13. 
3. Analysis 
The KWSB has serious weaknesses in its operational, managerial and financial systems. 
As is apparent from the stakeholders’ responses above, political interference, thefts and leakages, 
a poor system of revenue recovery and dubious methods of awarding contracts are some of the 
common problems. 
With regard to the privatisation, decision making and follow-up implementation were not 
done in an appropriate and consistent manner, which resulted in several setbacks. The initial 
strategy was worked out in a clandestine manner without consulting the KWSB staff. Thereafter, 
decisions were announced in a hasty manner, which created mistrust among the stakeholders. 
The matter was not even brought to the KWSB board/governing body for review, comment or 
routine discussion14. In sum, the private sector participation approach was perceived as a 
                                                 
13 It was a very useful idea, which was also reported in some press statements during these deliberations. However 
no response was given by the authorities about the feasibility (or otherwise) of its implementation. 
14 Interview with Mr. Abdul Baqi Siddiqui, former Managing Director, KWSB, Karachi. 
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clandestine plan of the upper tiers of government that was implemented from the top rather than 
evolving from the ground upwards. 
During the next stage, the process of launching the PSP, the short-listed contracting firms 
were all foreign. No local firm was invited to join the bidding process or to enter into 
negotiations. There are several reasons associated with this. First, local engineering firms do not 
have any previous experience of running a water supply and sewerage service. Therefore, only 
those firms who had a track record of managing this kind of service were invited to participate. 
Second, the short-listed firms’ systems of working were compatible with the organisational 
culture and approach of the donor agencies (principally the World Bank)15. Hence, the donors 
preferred to involve only these firms in the process. Third, it was advisable to involve foreign 
firms so as to avoid any local political interference in the bidding process. And fourth, the 
secrecy of the privatisation plan, which was crucial during the early stages, could only be 
guaranteed by involving foreign firms. 
While the private sector participation strategy for the KWSB ostensibly aimed to launch 
sustainable reforms in the sector, the actual concept adopted for the process is different. The 
government officials concerned, in association with the World Bank, devised a strategy 
practically to sell the KWSB to a private operator. In this they would have provided various 
concessions, subsidies and risk management guarantees. It was not a balanced procedure since it 
safeguarded the interest of only one actor, the private operator. The interests of the government 
and consumers were not guaranteed. 
In addition, the theme of the chosen strategy did not focus upon the root cause of non-
recovery of user charges, which was due to the poor level of service provided by the KWSB. 
                                                 
15 The consultants had very clearly recommended the international water companies for PSP owing to their past 
experience. 
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Rather, the strategy only emphasised steps to recover user charges and dues. Consumers held the 
view that they were willing to pay their charges promptly provided they obtained proper services 
in return. 
The details of the procedures were not scientifically developed. Before formulation of the 
PSP strategy there was no survey of the existing network of supply and pumping, nor was any 
system documentation carried out. Similarly, various contextual realities were not outlined in the 
process. For example, the KWSB has been the subject of political interference throughout its 
existence. No mention was made of how this political interference, both internal and external, 
could be countered. Therefore, many ambiguities would have been left inbuilt into the 
privatisation process. 
It is also clear from the above interviews that the viewpoints, interests and objectives of 
the various stakeholders were not included in the system of privatisation, nor was anyone invited 
to voice their opinions. Although the proposed PSP strategy suggested the creation of various 
organs, such as a water commission, the adopted strategy did not include peoples’ points of view 
at any stage16. The water supply and sanitation service has a large number of stakeholder groups. 
They comprise consumers/users, professionals, the staff of the KWSB, water vendors, local 
politicians, area leaders, city administrators, businessmen and other groups. These groups were 
largely ignorant of the formulation of the PSP strategy for the KWSB17. 
The feasibility report that was prepared by the consultants does not register the prevailing 
trends and user responses to the water and sanitation services. While the report does mention the 
fact that consumers are dissatisfied and thus not willing to pay, it does not suggest ways by 
which consumers could be motivated to pay their water bills. The entire weight of the feasibility 
                                                 
16 As is clear from the earlier description, the first visible form of consultation on a limited scale was only done by 
the Independent Committee. The GoS did not consult the people directly about PSP at any stage. 
17 For details see Ercelawan and Nauman (1998). 
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report rests on factors that are not consumer driven. For example, the feasibility of the PSP 
strategy recommends the enhancement of foreign investment in the water and sanitation sector, 
reducing and finally eliminating government subsidies and relying on the partial risk guarantee 
(PRG) committed by the World Bank. The Steering Committee on the PSP approved these 
recommendations despite the fact that the independent committee rejected this approach on the 
grounds that the World Bank itself had said that the PSP might not be an advisable option in the 
current circumstances. 
The consultants’ report, along with feedback from the stakeholders, clearly reveal that the 
private operator would rely and work with the existing source and network arrangements without 
any major system improvements. Thus, the quantity of water and the type of sewerage disposal 
available to the city would remain the same after privatisation. It is also assumed that since the 
private operator would not be in a position quantitatively to add water supplies, it would have to 
resort to the same cycle of water provision and allocation. As a result, people would not 
experience any visible change after privatisation, at least during the first few years. Besides, as 
the population is growing and new apartment/residential/commercial projects are emerging, 
pressure will mount on the private operator to sanction new connections, thus exerting a greater 
load on the existing supply. 
From the above, it is clear that people would be paying more for the same (and perhaps 
worse) system of water supply and sewerage service after privatisation, if the adopted strategy 
for PSP were to go ahead. As a result, there would be widespread resentment. Many people 
believe privatisation to be synonymous with a drastic improvement of services, yet in the current 
situation in Karachi it would mean a stagnation of service standards. It is also a common 
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observation that the private operator would refrain from undertaking of any major capital 
expenditure, at least during the initial period after privatisation. 
It should also be noted that privatisation of water and sewerage service will have a direct 
effect on the existing set of stakeholders involved in the water trade, most of whom are 
completely ignorant of its process and dynamics. Since their economic, social and political 
interests will be affected, they will be likely to resist the operations of the private operator. This 
may have an adverse effect on the performance of the private operator18. 
Finally, the economic and financial analysis conducted by the consultants was based on 
data supplied by the KWSB and other government departments. The realities of the situation are 
different from these facts and figures and other information used. This will lead to 
underestimates as far as the demand and consumption aspects of planning are concerned, while 
overestimates on the supply side will also result. 
4. Conclusions  
It is apparent that there are two clear views of private sector participation in the KWSB. 
The policymakers justify the privatisation of the KWSB on the grounds of financial malpractice. 
As a result, they have devised solutions that primarily focus upon the financial reincarnation of 
the KWSB. Stakeholders, on the other hand, are critical of the KWSB’s service delivery process 
and view privatisation as a possible tool to remedy the system. However, the private sector 
participation strategy that has been prepared by the decision makers concerned only remedies the 
financial aspects and does not guarantee service improvement. 
                                                 
18 This is exactly what happened in the privatisation of solid waste management services in North Karachi and the 
Federal B Area of Karachi Central District. The sanitation workers and their political patrons employed various 
illegal means to hamper the work of the contractor in order to retain their jobs and pressurise the District Municipal 
Corporation. 
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In the prevailing political and administrative climate of Sindh, the privatisation of the 
KWSB using the present strategy will be difficult. Even the World Bank has shown its 
reservation (according to Usmani et al., 1999). However, at any later stage the government is 
likely to revise the process and reapply it in a mode that conforms to the objectives of the donor 
agencies. 
Absence of commitment from the different ranks of management in the KWSB will also pose a 
serious problem in the application of any PSP strategy. While the upper tiers of government are 
powerful, the staff and management of the KWSB have the capacity to create resistance. The 
court cases filed by the labour union of the KWSB and its former managing director are 
examples. 
The dynamics that led to the creation and application of the PSP clearly suggest that it 
has been imposed from the top as a macro-level decision, without the decision makers gauging 
fundamental, ground level realities. Background analysis of the PSP shows that there was no 
informed decision making. No study or serious dialogue was conducted and this eventually led to 
procedural problems. If privatisation is implemented, the worst off will be the low-income 
groups who have least financial and procedural choices. 
While the KWSB has been declared financially impotent, the reasons behind this have 
been neither documented nor analysed during the decision-making process. Only the end state of 
the KWSB has been used as a strong reason for its nascent selling in the market. 
In addition, the various linkages that operate in the water supply and sanitation sector 
have not been taken into account. Thus, decision making has entirely relied upon the general 
information that is available or that has been provided by official sources. In this way, the fact 
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that water is already traded as a saleable commodity, one that has a widespread market of buyers 
and sellers from upper- to lower-income groups, has been missed. 
From the proposed privatisation strategy there appears no convincing evidence about how 
the system would improve after privatisation since the proposed private operator has been 
advised to focus only on tariff enforcement and improving revenue collection. The entire 
feasibility study submitted by the consultants can be cited as an illustration of this. 
The compound after effects of the privatisation of the water supply, given the proposed 
tariff rates, will be very severe. However, this has not been accounted for or analysed. When 
there is a rise in water prices, all the goods and services that use water in any way will 
experience a rise in price. The poor will be directly affected as a result. 
People are aware of the overall performance of the KWSB and of the crises in the water 
and sanitation sector. In principle, they are not against privatisation. However, consumers 
demand a reasonable service on a proportional tariff structure that is compatible with their socio-
economic status. 
5. Recommendations 
In response to the above analysis and conclusions, the following recommendations should 
be considered. They are cited at three levels: conceptual, structural and financial. 
Conceptually, the objectives of privatisation need to be revised. It is apparent that the 
financial aspect is the key factor around which the PSP strategy was devised. A more appropriate 
priority would be to devise a strategy for optimum service delivery to people at an affordable and 
acceptable charge. Involvement of stakeholders is vital to seek their cooperation, develop 
consensus and minimise resistance. The CDGK being the representative local government at 
present may initiate the process. 
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Water has been a public good throughout Karachi’s history. If water is transformed from 
a public good to a private one, and its supply is transferred from public service to a commercial 
outlet, then privatisation may not succeed. Therefore, in the real terms, an approach needs to be 
devised whereby water as a public good can be supplied to people through appropriate 
participation by the private sector. This may include the involvement of various service providers 
on a contractual basis working under the control of a public body. Billing and recoveries, retail 
distribution, repair and maintenance, emergency/relief supplies through tankers and addressing 
operational complaints are a few areas where the contracted input of private sector may be 
attempted. 
Structurally, the KWSB’s services may be disaggregated. If any alternative strategy has 
to be recommended, it should be based on the concept of unbundling the water and sewerage 
services. The production of potable water in bulk, the distribution network of water throughout 
the metropolitan city area, water distribution in bulk for identified and organised areas, sewerage 
collection, transmission and treatment etc. could be handed over (after decentralisation) to the 
organisations listed below. 
• The City District Government of Karachi (CDGK) for the production of raw water and its 
treatment; 
• The KWSB (now WSD) for the distribution and conveyance of water to various points in 
the city; 
• The town municipal administrations for the retail distribution of water and management 
of sewerage and sewage collection; 
• The private sector—any of these unbundled units could be contracted out to the private 
sector through a carefully considered arrangement; 
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• A regulatory body—could ensure the smooth functioning of all the organisations, 
undertaking necessary but minimum coordination between them, keeping a watch on the 
performance and achievement of negotiated targets and looking after the interests of all 
consumers in an equitable manner. If this concept is accepted by the GoS, details will have to be 
worked out by consultants in association with professionals, NGOs/CBOs and other relevant 
organisations19. 
As proposed by various stakeholders, and also apparent from the balance sheet of the 
KWSB, a concentrated effort must be made to recover the maximum amount in water charges 
based on the existing billing structure. However, the recovery drive must proceed in line with 
visible improvements in services. Various options for bill recovery should be studied. For 
example, the water bill can be tied up with land revenue. Another option is to attach/include 
water charges with electricity, gas and telephone charges. This would create easy access to a 
maximum number of consumers. It is apparent that if the KWSB recovers up to 80% of its bills, 
it may resolve the collection problems without involving operational control of private firms. 
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Table 1. Water supply and sanitation in Karachi—some basic facts. 
Bulk water supply 
(1997) 
388 million gallons 
per day (mgd) 
  
Bulk water demand 
(1997) 
665 mgd   
Bulk water supply 
(2000) (projected) 
605 mgd   
Bulk water demand 
(2000) (projected) 
820 mgd   
Water demand (1998) 
Low-income localities 63 litre/capita/day   
Middle-income 
localities 
132 litre/capita/day   
High-income 
localities 
335.5 litre/capita/day   
INVENTORY OF SERVICES 
Bulk water supply Retail water supply 
Quantity (water) 1. Water mains and 
distribution lines 
3360 miles 
1. Indus 263 mgd 2. Pumping station 
and boosting 
131  
2. Haleji 20 mgd 3. Community taps 3378  
3. Dumlottee 100 mgd 4. Hydrants (for 10  
N. Ahmed and M. Sohail / Water Policy 6 (2003) 229-247 
 32
tanker supply) 
4. Huba 100 mgd 5. Water tankers 28 Nos 
Total 388 mgd 6. Reservoirs 8 Nos 
Sources Sewerage services 
1. Dumlottee wells 7 Nos 1. Trunk sewers 113 miles 
2. Dumlottee conduit 25 miles 2. Sub mains and 
lateral sewers 
2700 miles 
3. Haleji conduit 60 miles 3. Rising mains 44 miles 
4. Indus system 80 miles 4. Treatment plantb 
(20 mgd each) 
2 Nos 
5. Hub system 35 miles 5. Pumping station 24 Nos 
6. Major pumping 
station 
10 Nos 6. Automatic sewer 
cleaning machine 
12 Nos 
7. Filter plants  7. Main/sub mains 
sewer 
272 miles 
Gharo 2 Nos 8. Ejector 11 Nos 
COD Hill 2 Nos   
Pipri and Gharo 2 Nos   
North East Karachi 1 Nos   
8. Tunnel 2½ miles   
a. Hub source is fast drying up. 
b. A third treatment plant is being built at Mauripur, Karachi West. 
Source: KWSB, 1998. 
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Table 2. KWSB—evolution of private sector participation (PSP). 
KWSB privatisation 
• Preparation and implementation of private sector participation in the Karachi water 
supply and sewerage sector. 
Project objective 
• To assist the Government of Sindh in preparing and implementing a transaction that will 
efficiently involve the private sector in the provision of Karachi’s water supply and sewerage 
services. 
Three-phase approach 
• Phase I covers the development of the most appropriate PSP strategy. 
• Phase II covers the preparatory work for private sector participation. 
• Phase III covers the implementation of the recommended and agreed programme. 
Phase I: Strategy development 
• Recommend a preferred approach for private sector participation (PSP). 
• Explore the potential and benefits of horizontal unbundling of the integrated water supply 
and sewerage system. 
• Define the broad legal and regulatory framework and the role and responsibility of the 
government. 
• Seek agreement from the relevant government agencies on the preferred PSP design. 
Deliverable aims for Phase I  
• A report on the design of the preferred approach for the Karachi water supply and 
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sewerage sector 
• Agreement from the GoS, the Privatisation Commission and the Ministry of Environment 
and Urban Affairs on the recommended approach 
Phase II: Preparation 
• Evaluate, in detail, the risks involved in the chosen PSP approach. 
• Evaluate the technical and financial feasibility of the chosen PSP approach. 
• Review the investment needs and objectives and propose an overall strategy for project 
finance. 
Deliverable aims for Phase II 
• A detailed technical and financial feasibility report 
• Detailed assessment of the impact of introducing the recommended PSP approach 
• A project finance strategy and plan for mobilising the investment needed 
Phase III: Implementation 
• Preparation of documents: 
 – prepare a brief but effective prequalification document; 
 – prepare all bidding documents. 
Deliverable aims for Phase IIIa 
• Prequalification documents 
• Bidding documents 
a. Could not be undertaken as the process was halted in 1996 by a court order. 
Source: KWSB, 1998. 
 
Table 3. Summary of stakeholders’ response. 
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No. Stakeholder category Summary of responsea 
01 Government: 
Four senior officials of 
GoS/KWSB interviewed; all three 
members of the Independent 
Committee interviewed 
• GoS/KWSB favoured PSP. It was expected 
that KWSB would be able to begin debt retirement 
as a consequence. 
• Government appointed Independent 
Committee cited reservations. Reservations of the 
consultants, political uncertainty in Karachi, 
impending cost burden on low income groups and 
non-clarity about the success in debt retirement were 
the reasons. 
02 KWSB: 
A senior engineer, a director of an 
administrative wing and a trade 
union leader interviewed 
• All cadres of staff were against PSP. 
Absence of proof for local demand, lack of input 
from consumers, clandestine process of deliberations 
and lack of evidence of exploring other options were 
the arguments cited for this point of view.  
03 Water trades: 
Chairman of Karachi Water 
Traders Association and a water 
tanker operator interviewed 
• Water vendors held the view that 
privatisation may not bring about any improvement 
in the current situation. 
• Betterment of service level has been 
considered doubtful; poor were already paying high 
prices from vending outlets and limited clientele of 
KWSB were outlined in support of this view.  
04 Real estate builders and • In builder’s view, privatisation may help 
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developers: 
Chairman, Association of Builders 
and Developers, a former 
Chairman ABAD and a local 
builder interviewed 
improve the situation. 
• If technical standards are improved, staffing 
rationalised and minimum disturbance approach is 
adopted, it may be successful. 
• Current process was not found appropriate as 
the KWSB was being directly sold to a foreign 
company and tariff burden was likely to increase for 
the poor.  
05 Local politicians: 
A former mayor and municipal 
councillor interviewed 
• Former major and councillor were against 
privatisation. 
• Tariff hikes affecting poor people, lack of 
success stories in other sectors and possibility of 
unemployment owing to possible retrenching in 
KWSB were the main reasons for this point of view. 
06 Consultants: 
Chief Engineer of a large local 
consulting firm, an independent 
consultant and a former 
Chairperson of Institute of City 
and Regional Planning interviewed
• Consultants believed that privatisation is not 
required in the prevailing circumstances. 
• Remote possibility of rise in service levels, 
extra price ranges for the same kind of service and 
possible benefits only for the affluent were the given 
reasons. 
07 City administrators: 
A former Director General, 
Karachi Development Authority 
• Privatisation may not be useful. 
• Lack of possibility to access a sincere buyer, 
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and a former Managing Director 
KWSB interviewed 
defence and internal security considerations, absence 
of innovative components and incomplete 
participation of associated donor agencies are the 
reasons. 
08 Concerned citizen groups: 
Convenor of a major consumer 
rights group, chairperson of a 
labour relations organisation, 
board member of an advocacy 
group, a coordinator of a 
development related NGO and a 
civic affairs reporter of a national 
daily interviewed 
• One group felt that privatisation might be a 
good option for paying consumers. It might improve 
the service delivery. 
• A second group felt privatisation is not 
advisable as it will not improve service. Perhaps if 
defaulter departments pay water bills, privatisation 
may not be needed at all. 
• Third group believed that KWSB should 
only be privatised if service levels are expected to 
improve. Eradication of corruption, affordable 
delivery of water and due consultation with people 
were the key factors cited as pre-requisites. 
09 Residents of planned areas: 
Thirty five residents of apartments 
and single unit housing 
participated in a focused group 
meeting 
• They knew little about privatisation. 
• Generally found averse owing to potential 
rise in water rates. Not sure whether privatisation 
would improve the situation. 
10 Residents of unplanned areas: 
Two focused group meetings held 
• One group felt privatisation may be useful 
but its benefits are neither clear nor made public. 
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in two separate squatter 
settlements with a total 
participation of around 40 
residents 
• Second group favoured privatisation 
conditionally if the level of service rises and water 
supply becomes affordable. 
a. All the interviews were based on a structured questionnaire. Focused group meetings were 
conducted on the basis of a checklist agenda, although a great deal of free discussion was 
allowed and encouraged. 
